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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

THOMAS ALBERT PERFETTO,

Case No.
11914

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION
IN LOWER COURT
Appellant appeals from a conviction in the Sec-

ond Judicial District Court, in Weber County, the

Honorable John F. Wahluist, presiding, of the offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4(3) (Supp. 1969)
of selling L.S.D., for which he was sentenced to
spend five years to life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction

and sentence.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's recital of facts is substantially cm
rect. Respondent's additions and corrections ar:
made hereinafter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE DOES NOT VIOLAT1
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Appellant was sentenced under the Drug Abust
Control Law, Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4(3) (Supp
1969) to be:
". . . punished by imprisonment in the
state prison from five years to life and shall
not be eligible for release upon completion of
sentence or on parole or on any other basis until
he has served not less than three years."

(Compare other mandatory minimum sentence requirements, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-62-9 (1967); 58-3J
4(2), (4) (Supp. 1969).)
Article VII § 12 of the Utah Constitution em
powers the board of pardons to:
" ... remit fines and forfeitures, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments .... "

Appellant c.rgues that the clause in Section
33-4(3) which prohibits release from prison for thre0

3

years would be unconstitutional if applied to limit
the powers of the board of pardons and, therefore,
appellant should be resentenced. Resentencing
would allow the trial judge an opportunity to grant
probation-which was thought at the trial to be prohibited by the allegedly invalid clause (T. 232-54).
He argues, alternatively, that the entire section is invaJid and requires the release of appellant.
POINT IA
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED
THE LEGISLATURE'S POWER TO PREVENT PROBATION.

The legislature plainly has power to limit the
availability of probation and sentence suspension.
Statutes have long regulated the probationary and
suspension powers of the courts. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-35-17, 77-62-31 (1953). That these powers originate with the legislature has been recognized by
this Court. Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 391, 149
P.2d 640, 642 (1942); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296,
303, 259 P. 1044, 1046 (1927). Insofar as section 5833-4(3) limits the availability of probation and suspension, it is constitutional and appellant is not entitled
to resentencing in order to receive an opportunity
for probation.
POINT IB
APPELLANT'S THREE YEAR MANDATORY SENTENCE REQUIREMENT IS NOT PROPERLY CHALLENGED SINCE ALLEGED LIMITS ON THE BOARD
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OF PARDONS HA VE NOT WORKED TO HIS DETRJ
MENT.

Possibly unconstitutional implications of thstatute are not before the Court at this time. Tbboard of pardons has not sought to exercise any c
its powers to "remit fines and forfeitures, comrnu10
punishments, and grant pardons after conv1c
tion ... " (Utah Const. Art. VII § 12) in behalf of
pellant. In effect, the three year mandatory sentence
does not operate against appellant until it affecri
proceedings for his release. At present,
serves his five to life sentence and has no standinc
to question the mandatory three year sentence. Sc:.
Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 43l
440, 446 P.2d 958 (1968). The question raised by ap
pellant (Appellant's Brief at 4) as to whether
role power is vested in the board of pardons is
therefore, inapposite. It may be noted, however, tha:
this power likely resides not in the board, but rather
in the legislature. Mannix v. Turner, Civil No.
3d Dist. Ct., Utah, July 15, 1970.
POINT IC
REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE THREE
YEAR MANDATORY SERVICE REQUIREMENT, APPELLANT'S CONVICTION AND FIVE YEARS TO LIFE
SENTENCE REMAIN EFFECTIVE.

Even if the board of pardons sought to act for
appellant and thereby raised the question of iii
1
powers, appellant's conviction and sentence mus
remain. Unconstitutional statutory operations can be
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excluded from a statute's meaning without impairing the effect of the remainder of the statute when
the excluded interpretations do not appreciably interfere with the legislature's principle intent. See, State
v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 68, 426 P.2d 13, 14, 15 (1967);
State v. Ledkins, 5 Utah 2d 422, 425, 303 P.2d 1099, 1101
(1956); Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429,
211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949). Clearly, the principle intent
of the legislature in enacting section 58-33-4(3) was to
establish and define a crime and set a penalty for
its commission. The crime and principle provisions
of the penalty are unaffected by any interpretation
of the powers of the board of pardons. The crime of
selling L.S.D. under which appellant was convicted
must, then, remain as must the sentence of five years
to life.
Thus, appellant's argument that he should be
resentenced in order to gain an opportunity for probation fails since the legislature which limited appellant's access to probation had full power to do
so. The alternate argument that the entire convicting
statute is invalid because one clause unconstitutionally limits the powers of the board of pardons also
fails. Since that clause has not affected any proceedings for appellant's release, no question of appellant's constitutional rights thereunder is raised.
Further, any potential unconstitutional operations of
the statute as applied to the board's powers can be
severed without disturbing appellant's conviction
or five years to life sentence.
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POINT II
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER THE ONLY STATUTE APPLICABLE TO HIS
PROVEN CONDUCT.

In addition to prohibiting the sale of L.S.D., the
Drug Abuse Control Law provides that:
"Whenever the possession, sale, transfer, or
dispensing of any drug or substance would constitute an offense under this act and also constitutes an offense under the laws of this state
relating to the possession, sale, transfer, or
dispensing of drugs or marijuana, such offense
shall not be punishable under this act but
shall be punishable under the other provisions
of the law." Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(3) (e)
(Supp. 1969) (Cited as 58-33-6(2) (e) in Appellant's Brief at 8.)

Appellant claims his felony conviction under
Section 58-33-4(3), is unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection of the law because the same offense
is allegedly punishable as a misdemeanor under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 4-26-3 et. seq. (Supp. 1969) (sale of
adulterated or misbranded drugs).
No evidence was adduced at trial to indicate
that the L.S.D. sold by appellant was adulterated or
misbranded. The question is not now properly before this court.
Even if it were, the sale of a hallucinogenic druc'
under Section 58-33-4(3), and the sale of an adul-
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terated or a misbranded drug under sections 4-26-3
et. seq. are separate offenses which may be punished
separately. It is immaterial that both offenses stemmed from the same act.
A single act may commit two separately punishable offenses when different evidence is required to
sustain each offense and when all the elements of
one offense are not necessarily included in the
other. State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 73, 157 P.2d 258,
262 (1945); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 30304 (1932); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 27 C.2d 500, 165
P.2d 1, 2 (1946); Lawton v. Hand, 186 Kan. 385, 388, 350
P.2d 28, 31 (1960); State v. Johnson, 60 Wash.2d 21, 24,
25, 371P.2d611, 612 (1962).
In State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146
(1969), two statutes made illegal the possession of
L.S.D. The evidence required to prove the offense
under each statute was identical. This court rightly
held that the statutes deprived the defendant of
equal protection of the law. The same conclusion
was reached in Staff v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d
168 (1969) where two statutes made unlawful the
forging of a drug prescription.
A different conclusion must be reached in the
instant circumstances. Every hallucinogenic drug is
not necessarily adulterated or misbranded. The
Proof of different elements is required to identify
the sale of a hallucingenic drug in contrast to an
adulterated or a misbranded drug. As a result, appellant might be convicted of either or both offenses
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arising from the same act without impairing his constitutional rights.
Thus, in Blockburger, supra, at 303-04, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a conviction for selling
morphine without a written order and a conviction for
selling morphine not in or from the original stamped
package-even though both convictions stemmed
from the same sale. In United Cigar Whelan Stores r.
United States, 113 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1940) the defendant
had been convicted of two offenses arising from the
same sale: selling denatured alcohol for beverage
purposes and selling denatured alcohol in unstamped containers. Both convictions were upheld.
See also Kellett v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 409
P.2d 206 (1966); People v. Tideman, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207,
370 P.2d 1007 (1962); Rodriguez, supra; Lawton, supra;
Johnson, supra.

Appellant also finds his offense included in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-42-13 (Supp. 1969) which makes the
selling of a "psychotoxic chemical solvent" unlawful
under some circumstances.
" 'Psychotoxic chemical solvent' includes
any glue, cement, or other substance containing one or more of the following chemical
compounds: acetone, and acetate, benzene,
butyl-alcohol, ethyl alcohol, ethylene dichloride,
isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl
ketone, pentchloro-phenol, petroleum ether, or
other chemical substance capable of causing a
condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain
or nervous system as a result of the inhalation
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of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-42-10 (Supp.
1969).

No proof was adduced at trial to indicate that
L.S.D. is a psychotoxic chemical solvent or that the
sale was made with the "knowledge and belief that
the purchaser" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-42-13 (Supp.
1969)) intended to "smell or inhale" (Utah Code Ann.
76-42-11 (Supp. 1969)) the L.S.D. These questions are
'Jt now properly before the Court.
Even had they been raised, the trial record indicates that the L.S.D. sold by appellant was powdered (T. 31) and enclosed in a capsule (T. 38). In neither
states does the drug emit "fumes or vapors" as required by the definition of psychotoxic chemical
solvent in Section 76-42-10. It is true that any substance if heated enough can emit fumes or vapors.
Thus, boiling liquor could conceivably be classified as a psychotoxic chemical solvent. But the
statute would be unconstitutionally vague if it included liquor or L.S.D.-both of which are usually
3Wallowed. The legislature clearly did not intend
such vague inclusions.
Additionally, by the rule of ejusdem generis (Great
Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching, 18 Utah 2d 45, 414
P.2d 963, rehearing, 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504
0966); Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839
(1962); Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d
631 (1960), cert. den. 365 U.S. 860 (1961)) "any other sub0tance" is limited by things in the same class as
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"glue and cement", a class of commonly inhaled
chemicals.
Respondent submits, then, that appellant's claim
that equal protection of the law was denied him can
not be raised in this court since neither the question
nor the necessary empirical data were presented to
the trial court. Had they been, appellant's contention
still fails since his offense is clearly only punishable
under the statute upon which his conviction was
based and, therefore, raises no question of equal
protection.
POINT III
THE UTAH DRUG ABUSE CONTROL LAW CLEAR
LY DEFINES APPELLANT'S OFFENSE AND CLEARLY
PRESCRIBES HIS PUNISHMENT.

The Utah Drug Abuse Control Law requires any
drug or marijuana offense to be punished under
other statutory provisions, if possible. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-36-6(3) (e) (Supp. 1969). Even before adoption of this section, if appellant desired to know the
law he was obliged to search the other statutory
provisions and to fit his questioned behavior with·
in the applicable section if any. The new law adds
no additional uncertainties to this procedure. Appel·
lant must still search the other statutes related to mari·
juana and drugs and attempt to fit the questioned
behavior within the applicable statute. If he finds
no applicable statute, he may then turn to the of·
fenses defined in the new law.
Appellant was convicted under the only offense
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(Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4(3)) which can be proved
by the evidence introduced at trial. Thus, any doctrine of "lenity" (Shondel, supra; compare, State v. Twitchell,
8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (1959)) is inapplicable.
No uncertainty as to punishment exists.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of Section 58-33-4(3) concerning
appellant's crime and sentence to five years to life
in the state prison do not contravene the Utah Constitution Art. VII § 12. Specific questions as to the
power of the board of pardons do not presently affect appellant and are not properly raised.
Appellant was convicted of an offense covered
only by one statute and one punishment. As a result, there is no question as to the certainty of the
offense or the punishment applied.
This Court should, therefore, affirm the decision
of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

